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Nietzsche, Nihilism, and the Virtue of Nature 
To impose upon becoming the character of being 
—that is the supreme will to power. (WP 567)[1] 
 
 
Nietzsche’s view of nature and his attack on the platonic tradition has given 
him a reputation as a nihilist, a label he himself acknowledged. Yet what 
does Nietzsche mean by nihilism? and to what extent is he a nihilist? This 
article explores Nietzsche’s use of the term as it relates to modernity, his 
own postmodern project, and how it is connected with what Nietzsche calls 
“virtue.” 
 
The problem of nature 
 
Nietzsche has been called a nihilist for his rejection of universal standards 
for justice and virtue. Generally speaking, interpretations of Nietzsche and 
his view of nature vary according to whether his break with metaphysics is 
seen as complete, and whether his break is considered desirable. Heidegger, 
Nietzsche’s most important interpreter, emphasizes Nietzsche’s 
understanding of nature as an ordering principle. Modernity, according to 
Heidegger, is nothing more than the sustained and growing ignorance of 
Being. Since Plato, Heidegger argues, each generation of philosophers has 
become less and less able to comprehend the question of Being, much less 
speak to its nature. Hence Nietzsche was correct to attack Plato and the 
tradition of metaphysics he inspired. “As the fulfillment of modern 
metaphysics,” writes Heidegger, “Nietzsche’s metaphysics is at the same 
time the fulfillment of Western metaphysics in general and is thus — in a 
correctly understood sense — the end of metaphysics as such.”[2] Heidegger 
presents Nietzsche as the final nail in the coffin of modernity’s vulgar and 
tyrannical metaphysics. 
Heidegger takes issue, however, with Nietzsche’s overzealousness. 
Heidegger claims that Nietzsche was so bent on the destruction of 
metaphysics that his philosophy adopted a metaphysical pose. For 
Heidegger, Nietzsche’s metaphysics too closely resemble those of 
Aristotle.[3] Heidegger considers the highest element of Nietzsche’s thought, 
the eternal return, not the first breath of postmodernity, but the “final 
thought of Western metaphysics.”[4] Heidegger argues that the eternal 
return is either non-philosophic mysticism or a philosophy borrowed from 
Heraclitus.[5] In either event, Nietzsche failed in his attempted break with 
metaphysics, and was merely another in the long line of philosophers who 
misunderstood the importance of Being. 
Rorty follows Heidegger in celebrating the end of Western metaphysics. For 
Rorty, postmodernism is, at its root, the rejection of an objective view of 
nature. The belief in absolute value, Rorty claims, originates in Greek 
philosophy and continues on into the Enlightenment and includes even 
Heidegger.[6] The “realists,” as Rorty refers to them, wish to ground the 
“solidarity” of political communities in Nature and Truth. As this assumes 
that their perceptions somehow correspond to reality, realists are required to 
construct a metaphysical support for their beliefs. It is far better, Rorty 
asserts, for the values of a community to be founded on its own conception 
of good, rather than on a belief in Nature, or as he would say it, for 
objectivity to be replaced by the demands of solidarity. 
In Rorty’s formulation, reliance on opinion supplants the need for Truth. The 
difference between knowledge and opinion is not a quality but quantity: 
wisdom and Truth are replaced by opinion and consensus.[7] Rorty invokes 
fellow pragmatist William James, who defines truth as “what is good for us 
to believe.”[8] In comparison, a realist “presupposes that knowledge, man, 
and nature have real essences which are relevant to the problem at hand.”[9] 
In effect, Rorty replaces Nature and Truth with a series of dynamic socio-
historical agreements, making philosophy in the platonic sense neither 
possible nor desirable. 
Rorty, like many others, sees Nietzsche as the first to assess accurately the 
nature of truth, and he emphasizes the part of Nietzsche’s thought that 
portrays nature as an unknowable chaos. Rorty quotes Nietzsche’s claim that 
truth is “a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms—
in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, 
and embellished poetically and rhetorically and which after long use seem 
firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which 
one has forgotten that this is what they are” (TL).[10] For Rorty, Nietzsche 
summarizes perfectly the major precept of postmodernism. So dependent on 
Nietzsche is Rorty that if Nietzsche did not exist, Rorty would have to invent 
him. 
These accounts of Nietzsche only agitate those concerned with the effects of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy. Many blame Nietzsche for the nihilistic sensibilities of 
the present age. Stanley Rosen presents such a case. Rosen disagrees with 
Heidegger on Nietzsche’s failure and with Rorty on Nietzsche’s value as a 
philosopher. Rosen believes that Nietzsche succeeded in his break with 
Western metaphysics, a feat that should be anything but celebrated. “In my 
opinion,” writes Rosen, “Nietzsche has no ultimate teaching of a theoretical, 
constructive nature. The riddle to Nietzsche’s consistency cannot be 
unlocked because it does not exist.”[11] For Rosen, Nietzsche’s teaching has 
the same outcome for which Nietzsche blames Platonism and Christianity: “it 
empties human existence of intrinsic value.”[12] Nietzsche’s teaching is not 
only contradictory; it is disquieting and dangerous. Rosen believes that even 
Nietzsche’s Yes-saying magnum opus, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, “implodes 
into chaos.”[13] 
Rosen’s analysis derives in part from his recognition of the problem of nature 
in Nietzsche’s writing. “The term nature thus plays an ambiguous role in 
Nietzsche’s thinking,” writes Rosen.[14] “Nietzsche advocates a return to the 
natural order in a sense, but not in a Platonic or Aristotelian sense.” For 
Nietzsche, “nature is power and, still more fundamentally, chaos.”[15] Rosen, 
unlike Heidegger, does not see Nietzsche as having an affinity with Aristotle 
and dismisses such nonsense. For Rosen, the result of the two views of 
nature in Nietzsche’s works is nihilism. Yes, nature is the standard for 
values, but if nature is chaos, as it is in Nietzsche, then all values are 
relative to man’s will to power. 
Leo Strauss is another key Nietzsche interpreter. In an often-neglected piece 
entitled “Relativism,” Strauss writes of Nietzsche’s “revaluation of all 
values”: 
Nietzsche may be said to have transformed the deadly truth of relativism 
into the most life-giving truth... We limit ourselves here to saying that the 
movement of Nietzsche’s thought can be understood as a movement from 
the supremacy of history towards the supremacy of nature, a movement 
that bypasses the supremacy of reason throughout or tries to replace the 
opposition between the subjective and the objective (or between the 
conventional and the natural) by the opposition between the superficial and 
the profound. Existentialism is the attempt to free Nietzsche’s alleged 
overcoming of relativism from the consequences of his relapse into 
metaphysics or of his recourse to nature.[16] 
Strauss is not dissembling when he warns that he is “[stating] the case with 
all necessary vagueness.”[17] Strauss is unable to be more specific, he 
claims, because he is unsure about Nietzsche’s final judgment concerning 
the will to power. Strauss ponders Nietzsche’s “hesitation as to whether the 
doctrine of the will to power is [a] subjective project to be superseded by 
other such projects in the future or whether it is the final truth.”[18] However 
much Strauss’s interpretation is wanting, his ambivalence illustrates 
perfectly the difficulty in coming to terms with Nietzsche and the role that 
nature plays in his teaching. 
These views also mirror the seemingly contradictory manner in which nature 
is presented in Nietzsche’s thought. On one hand, Nietzsche states that his 
goal is “to translate man back into nature” (BGE 230).[19] He argues that 
man has drifted too far from his natural self, sacrificing his instincts and 
power for the comfort and convenience of modern society. Nietzsche writes: 
“I use the word ‘vice’ in my fight against every kind of antinature or, if you 
prefer pretty words, idealism” (EH Books 5; emphasis added).[20] In this 
formulation, Nietzsche recommends a form of naturalism or metaphysics 
that seeks to ground science, morality, and politics in the innocence and 
integrity of nature. 
Yet nature also appears in Nietzsche’s writings as chaotic. Nature is 
described as “wasteful beyond measure, indifferent beyond measure, 
without purposes and consideration, without mercy and justice, fertile and 
desolate and uncertain at the same time; imagine indifference itself as a 
power” (BGE 9).[21] Nietzsche warns—“Let us beware”—against deifying 
nature. “The total character of the world...is in all eternity chaos,” Nietzsche 
teaches. “In the sense not of a lack of necessity but of a lack of order, 
arrangement, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever other names there are 
for our aesthetic anthropomorphisms” (GS 109).[22] Nietzsche denies that 
there are any “laws in nature”; rather, “there are only necessities.” 
Nietzsche breaks with those, including Plato, who view nature as the source 
of divinity and order in the universe and denies any teleological 
understanding of nature or man. And if there is no true end, there can be no 
“accidents” either. 
These somewhat paradoxical statements raise many questions. First, how 
can nature’s chaos ground political and moral life? If nature is indifferent, or 
even hostile, to man, how can it serve as a source of order and stability? 
Moreover, if nature is as adverse and unpleasant as Nietzsche claims it is, 
why should we be willing to accept it as a guide? This view demands that 
nature be overcome, not heralded. Also, why is it so difficult to live 
according to nature and instinct? Put differently, how was man ever able to 
break with nature in the manner that Nietzsche details? 
 
 
Nihilism and being 
 
Before concerning ourselves with the question of whether Nietzsche’s view of 
nature makes him a nihilist, we should first establish what is meant by the 
term nihilism. One interpreter usefully defines etymologically, as a “denial or 
negation, of the established and esteemed beliefs and values in morality and 
religion.”[23] Certainly this definition would include Nietzsche. 
But this is not Nietzsche’s sense of the term. Nihilism is used most often by 
Nietzsche when referring to the consequences of modernity and its reliance 
on reason.[24] On this he writes: “Faith in the categories of reason is the 
cause of nihilism. We have measured the value of the world according to 
categories that refer to a purely fictitious world” (WP 12b). This explains, 
Nietzsche notes, how it is that the greatest values have come to devalue 
themselves. In this respect, Nietzsche’s philosophy is nihilistic insofar as 
nihilism is the starting point for his positive philosophy.[25] 
Yet not all non-metaphysical philosophies are nihilistic.[26] Consider 
Alexander Bain, for whom belief is “that upon which a man is prepared to 
act.”[27] Similarly, William James notes, “beliefs...are really rules for 
action.”[28] Here, nihilism is not so much an –ism, as the inability of belief to 
supply a basis for action. Hence the problem is not that “everything is 
permitted,” as Ivan Karamazov says,[29] but that nothing is done. This is the 
nihilism at odds with life, the nihilism that Nietzsche envisions spreading 
across nineteenth century Europe (WP Pr. 2), and the nihilism that his 
philosophy aims to counter. 
The nihilism that Nietzsche fears is tied to inaction. “Life itself,” he writes, “is 
to my mind the instinct for growth, for durability, for an accumulation of 
forces, for power: where the will to power is lacking there is decline. It is my 
contention that all the supreme values of mankind lack this will—that the 
values which are symptomatic of decline, nihilistic values, are lording it 
under the holiest names” (A 6).[30] Nietzsche deplores this nihilism—“the 
sign of a despairing, morally weary soul” (BGE 10). Elsewhere, Nietzsche 
writes that suicide is “the deed of nihilism” (WP 247), and he recognizes 
“pessimism as a preliminary form of nihilism” (WP 9; Cf. 37, 38). In the 
Genealogy, Nietzsche describes nihilism as nothing more than nausea mixed 
with pity (GM 3.14; Cf. A 7).[31] If nihilism is a sort of inaction, then 
Nietzsche’s philosophy points away from nihilism, not to it. The will to power 
is nothing if not a doctrine of action.[32] 
For Nietzsche, a turn from nihilism requires not only that values serve life, 
but also that we actually believe them. Nietzsche writes: “That a great deal 
of belief must be present; that judgments may be ventured; that doubt 
concerning all essential values is lacking—that is the precondition of every 
living thing and its life. Therefore, what is needed is something that must be 
held to be true—not that something is true” (WP 507). Faith and belief are 
more valuable and indeed more crucial to life than is truth. 
The good or bad of nihilism is assessed according to its ability to inspire 
action. Consequently, Nietzsche speaks of many different forms of 
nihilism.[33] Of the many he names, four are the most important, and they 
appear in two pairs. Nihilism has four dimensions, depending on whether it 
is practical or theoretical (WP 4), active or passive (WP 22). Nietzsche places 
himself alongside the philosophers of the future in the theoretical-active 
category. 
 
 Active Passive 
Theoretical Nietzsche, Philosophers 
of the Future, Free 
Spirits, Free Minds, the 
Romans, pre-Socratics, 
Machiavelli 
Heidegger, 
Foucault 
Rorty, 
Derrida, 
Buddhists 
Practical Socialists, liberals, 
conservatives[34]; Jews, 
Muslims 
Christians 
 
The categories are inclusive in that, in a sense, it is impossible not to be a 
nihilist, because nihilism, in Nietzsche’s view, is an existential condition. As 
one interpreter notes, “nihilism is tied to being.”[35] The only way, Nietzsche 
argues, to avoid being a nihilist is to see life as more than the will to power, 
a notion he deems undesirable and impossible. “There is nothing to life that 
has value, except the degree of power — assuming that life itself is the will 
to power (WP 55). Yet if it is impossible to avoid thinking nihilism, it is 
essential that we avoid living nihilism.[36] Nihilism is tied to being as it 
articulates Nietzsche’s appreciation for the problem of nature. Once the 
Greek problem, before Socrates at least, this is the problem that Nietzsche 
seeks to resurrect in his philosophy of the future. 
For Nietzsche, nihilism is “ambiguous” (WP 22; emphasis removed).[37] 
Nietzsche sees “nihilism as a normal phenomenon [that] can be a symptom 
of increasing strength or of increasing weakness” (WP 585B). Nihilism can 
lead to strength as easily as it can lead to despair (WP 23). This was the 
reason that Nietzsche could speak with little difficulty of himself as a nihilist 
(WP 25). He was unaffected by the passive and practical nihilism that was 
spreading over Europe because he saw past it. Nietzsche writes: “He that 
speaks here...has done nothing so far but reflect: a philosopher and solitary 
by instinct, who has found his advantage is standing aside and outside, in 
patience, in procrastination, in staying behind;...as the first perfect nihilist of 
Europe who, however, has even now lived through the whole of nihilism, to 
the end, leaving it behind, outside himself” (WP Pr. 3). 
That Nietzsche could look past the nihilism made him wish to advance it all 
the more. Nietzsche saw value in nihilism. Nietzsche calls his revaluation of 
values “a movement that in some future will take the place of this perfect 
nihilism—but presupposes it, logically and psychologically, and certainly can 
come only after and out of it” (WP Pr. 4). Nietzsche’s philosophy does not so 
much celebrate nihilism, as it recognizes the overcoming of nihilism as the 
only true foundation upon which culture can thrive (UD 3).[38] 
Heidegger and Rorty miss the niceties of Nietzsche’s philosophy. To them, 
Nietzsche would most likely respond: “there may actually be puritanical 
fanatics of conscience who prefer even a certain nothing to an uncertain 
something to lie down on—and die. But this is nihilism and the sign of a 
despairing, mortally weary soul—however courageous the gestures of such a 
virtue may look” (BGE 10). In Nietzsche’s view, there is no essential 
difference between Plato’s “pure spirit and the good as such” and Rorty’s 
relativism, as both are bent on the tyranny of “denying perspective” (BGE 
Pr.). Both have anointed their opinion as truth and remain unwilling to 
consider rival truth-claims. Rorty’s teaching is merely the culmination of 
Plato’s teaching: a decayed modernism. Much to Rorty’s chagrin, Nietzsche 
would argue that there is a clear line from Plato to Rorty: both are nihilists, 
hostile to life. Rorty did not follow Nietzsche in his break from Platonic 
political philosophy; rather, Rorty continued modernity in spite of 
Nietzsche.[39] In this sense, Nietzsche would not consider Rorty the herald of 
the postmodern, but the continuation of the exhausted modern project. 
The difference between Nietzsche and Rorty is clearest concerning what each 
calls truth. While Nietzsche opposes the influence of democracy on 
philosophy, Rorty uses democracy, or a belief in the equality of individuals 
and consensus, as the standard for his “truth.” For Nietzsche, consensus is 
no standard by which to judge truth. Nietzsche, we should recall, was the 
first to proclaim the death of god as a fact of history, and he opposes 
Christianity and democracy despite their ability to achieve and maintain 
consensus. Truth—or what he more often calls “reality”—exists for Nietzsche 
independently of opinion, shared or otherwise. That most philosophers have 
agreed on any number of issues by no means increases the likelihood that 
they are correct; rather, it is more likely that their views are either partially 
mistaken or entirely false. The more perspectives that exist, the greater the 
chance that one is useful or true. Diversity, not consensus, and perspective 
through experience are prerequisites for a claim to truth. 
That others have misunderstood Nietzsche’s point is also evident in what 
Rorty says of Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey. He writes that each 
tried, in his early years, to find a new way of making philosophy 
‘foundational’....Each of the three, in his later work, broke free of the 
Kantian conception of philosophy as foundation, and spent his time warning 
us against those very temptations to which he himself had once succumbed. 
Thus their later work is therapeutic rather than constructive, edifying rather 
than systematic, designed to make the reader question his own motives for 
philosophizing rather than to supply him with a new philosophical 
program.[40] 
Viewing philosophy as therapeutic rather than creative or active is what 
Nietzsche means by theoretical and passive nihilism. Nothing is believed, so 
nothing is done. The best we can do is to comfort each other as we dangle 
over the abyss. 
Nietzsche may think modernity to its conclusion, but his perspectivism is not 
nihilism.[41] Nietzsche is not a nihilist in the conventional sense in that he 
does not consider all values to be of equal worth.[42] For Nietzsche, in fact, 
absolute relativism and absolute truth are virtually indistinguishable in their 
hostility to life.[43] Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal return is an attempt to 
avoid both extremes: it is not metaphysical, or “otherworldly,” because it is 
not absolute. It is nevertheless superior to other perspectives because it 
derives from a profound appreciation of nature and man’s will to power. 
Nietzsche presents the will to power as the fundamental fact of nature, and 
the eternal return, the embrace of eternal becoming, as the highest 
attainable goal. While Nietzsche recognizes the theoretical nihilism, or chaos, 
in which we exist, he advocates a philosophy that willfully transcends it. 
 
 
All too beautiful 
 
The other, more serious charge, against Nietzsche is that his philosophy is 
disquieting, dangerous, and just plain ugly. Consider Allan Bloom, who 
writes: 
Nietzsche wanted to destroy all scientific and metaphysical doctrines that 
would turn us away from a free examination of what we are and from taking 
ourselves seriously. He wanted to know the knower in order to evaluate 
what is said to be knowledge, and that is the most difficult of all 
philosophical undertakings. His is a model of the gifts and the dedication 
necessary for seeing what goes on within and developing adequate 
hypotheses about what it all means. He came to the conclusion that man is 
will to power, which is not, in the centrality of aspiration that it underlines, 
entirely without kinship with Eros. But Nietzsche could not call it Eros 
because he could not bring himself to believe that there is anything naturally 
beautiful.[44] 
Bloom acknowledges Nietzsche’s importance as a philosopher, yet takes 
issue with his doctrine of the will insofar as it does not admit, or at least that 
Nietzsche himself could not admit, that anything is “naturally beautiful.” 
There is much in Nietzsche’s works to support this view. Nietzsche thought, 
for example, that beauty was relative to matters of growth and preservation. 
In this respect, the strong and the weak both conceptualize the beautiful in 
different terms. The strong will know beauty in vastly different ways. Some 
may, for example, view the Christian as beautiful, while others may see 
beauty in Nietzsche’s will to power or the eternal return. In this formulation, 
“the beautiful exists just as little as does the good, or the true” (WP 804). 
Bloom misses the point, however; for Nietzsche, nothing was more beautiful 
than natural man, and the will to power is a doctrine that reflects this belief. 
“The world is overfull of beautiful things,” Nietzsche writes, “but 
nevertheless poor, very poor when it comes to beautiful moments and 
unveilings of these things. But perhaps this is the most powerful magic of 
life: it is covered by a veil interwoven with gold, a veil of beautiful 
possibilities, sparkling with promise, resistance, bashfulness, mockery, pity, 
and seduction. Yes, life is a woman” (GS 339). If nothing is naturally 
beautiful, it is only because man has lost his capacity for recognizing it. The 
world as will to power is beautiful because is serves what is most beautiful in 
man (AOM 342, GS 336).[45] The most we can say is that the will to power 
makes the naturally beautiful ugly as much as Plato’s eide makes the 
naturally ugly beautiful. 
Others claim that Nietzsche’s philosophy is dangerous or potentially 
disruptive. For Rosen, Nietzsche’s teaching is 
an appeal to the highest, most gifted human individuals to create a radically 
new society of artist-warriors[,]...expressed with rhetorical power and a 
unique mixture of frankness and ambiguity in such a way as to allow the 
mediocre, the foolish, and the mad to regard themselves as the divine 
prototypes of the highest men of the future. A radically new society requires 
as its presupposition the destruction of an existing society; Nietzsche 
succeeded in enlisting countless thousands in the ironical task or self-
destruction, all in the name of a future utopia.[46] 
Rosen does not mince words: Nietzsche is not on par with Plato as a 
philosopher; he appears alongside Marx as the philosophers most hostile to 
Western values. Rosen writes: “There cannot be the slightest doubt that, on 
Nietzschean grounds, theology, metaphysics, and ontology are all utter 
nonsense. Unfortunately, the same can be said of science and scientific 
philosophy, because these lead to the negation of sense and of the 
significance of human existence. The only consolation is art.”[47] 
In Herzog, Saul Bellow puts it this way: “Dear Herr Nietzsche...Humankind 
lives mainly upon perverted ideas. Perverted, your ideas are no better than 
those of the Christianity you condemn. Any philosopher who wants to keep 
his contact with mankind should pervert his own system in advance to see 
how it will really look a few decades after adoption.”[48] 
Although Nietzsche did not have the luxury of responding to Rosen and 
Bellow directly, he might have done so by referring to the passage from Ecce 
Homo where he writes: “Ultimately, nobody can get more out of things, 
including books, than he already knows. For what one lacks access to from 
experience one will have no ear” (EH Books 1). In other words, Nietzsche’s 
books are mirrors for the soul. Interpreting Nietzsche as ugly or dangerous 
says more about ourselves and our view of the world than it does about his 
philosophy. 
Furthermore, Nietzsche was well aware that his philosophy could be 
misused. “A book full of spirit communicates some of it to its opponents 
too,” he writes (AOM 160). Later in the same piece, he argues: “It says 
nothing against the ripeness of a spirit that it has a few worms” (AOM 353). 
Nietzsche understood the power of words, and did not hesitate to effect 
great change through his books. 
A better defense would include Nietzsche’s acknowledgement that his project 
requires a long period of time; he does not envision an overnight revolution 
or violence on a world-scale. “If a change is to be as profound as it can be,” 
Nietzsche writes, “the means to it must be given in the smallest doses but 
unremittingly over long periods of time! Can what is great be created at a 
single stroke?” (D 534).[49] If there is violence or destruction, it is more 
likely done to founders and creators whose strength and capacity for selfless 
deeds is great (TI Skirmishes 44).[50] 
Nietzsche saw his philosophy as a service to man. As a great destructive 
force, Nietzsche also embodies great potential (EH Destiny 2). “It is 
incontestable,” he writes, “that the spirit of humanity is almost in greater 
danger during the approach of such eras than it is when they and the chaotic 
turmoil they bring with them have actually arrived: the anxiety of waiting 
and the greedy exploitation of every minute brings forth all the cowardice 
and the self-seeking states of the soul, while the actual emergency, and 
especially a great universal emergency, usually improves men and makes 
them more warm-hearted” (SE 4).[51] If Nietzsche’s philosophy is dangerous, 
it is only because he is cognizant of the greater danger he is trying to avert. 
Like Rorty, Nietzsche has real problems with how knowledge is esteemed in 
the modern world. Unlike Rorty, Nietzsche wishes to restore the possibility of 
philosophy, and uses the will to power as a starting point. As Nietzsche 
writes: “of what concern to us is the existence of the state, the promotion of 
universities, when what matters above all is the existence of philosophy on 
earth! [Or]—to leave absolutely no doubt as to what I think—[it] is so 
unspeakably more vital that a philosopher should appear on earth than that 
a state or a university should continue to exist” (SE 8). Nietzsche’s primary 
task is the recovery of philosophy in a grand fashion; conversely, Rorty 
claims that such an act is neither possible nor desirable.[52] While Rorty and 
many postmodernists celebrate the end of philosophy, Nietzsche heralds its 
restoration as his primary goal. He wishes to change what is called 
philosophy, to uncover the moralism that has suffocated it for centuries, and 
to return it to its rightful place in the service of humanity. 
Nietzsche’s opposition to Plato and the tradition he inspired is not so much a 
negation of truth as an affirmation of perspective as an element of 
philosophy. Nietzsche’s new philosophy is not tyrannical: it does not value 
truth as its highest aim, nor does it perceive its subjective claims on truth as 
objective and absolute. It does not, and indeed cannot, create the world in 
its own image, for it does not claim such an act even to be possible, much 
less desirable. Nietzsche’s perspectivism incorporates experiences past and 
future. It is not the end or the limit of philosophic or scientific activity as 
much as it acts as a starting-point; his perspectivism is a floor, not a ceiling. 
In this sense, philosophy is perspective. 
Leo Strauss once wrote of Nietzsche: “It is certainly not an overstatement to 
say that no one has ever spoken so greatly and so nobly of what a 
philosopher is as Nietzsche.”[53] It is also not an overstatement to say that 
greater praise could not come from the pen of Strauss. However much 
Strauss is ambiguous on the nature of Nietzsche’s philosophy, he is firm in 
his praise of Nietzsche’s view of philosophy. 
 
Nietzsche’s virtues 
 
Nietzsche’s break with modern morality and modern standards for 
philosophy means that we must look elsewhere to determine how he should 
be evaluated. We need not look far for such a standard, for Nietzsche 
himself presents one: Nietzsche too has his virtues. Of course Nietzsche’s 
virtues are neither Christian nor Aristotelian; Nietzsche’s virtues are those of 
a philosopher, a philosopher of the future. 
Nietzsche lists four key virtues of a new philosopher: solitude, insight, 
courage, and sympathy.[54] The first, solitude, is the most explicit in 
Nietzsche. Solitude is a virtue because it is the means by which camel 
spirits, those individuals most burdened by the decadence of modern 
society, can save themselves. It is in solitude where camel spirits become 
lion spirits, destroyers of values. And it is through this metamorphosis that 
the natural creative impulses are revealed. Solitude is contrasted with 
society, the mass who value what is low in man, those who have no 
ambition, no goal, and indeed no god, whether they know it or not. Solitude 
is a virtue because it saves man from great vice. It is an opportunity for man 
to know nature, to know himself, and to allow himself to become an agent of 
nature. In solitude the will dialogues with nature. 
The second virtue, insight, accords with the next step in fashioning a 
philosophy of the future. The destruction made possible by solitude results 
from appreciating perspective through experience and a newfound sense of 
will. Christianity and democracy are vices insofar as they hinder the ability to 
know nature and man’s true self. As a virtue, insight replaces the rigid 
dogmatism of science and moral philosophy. Insight is a product of 
experience and an appreciation of perspective. 
Perhaps the most important virtue for Nietzsche is the one most lacking in 
modern society: courage (D 551). Courage is most simply understood as 
strength. As Nietzsche writes, “the first thing a philosopher needs: inflexible 
and rugged manliness” (SE 7). Courage is the mark of a strong will, one 
willing to risk oneself (EH Pr. 3, Wise 5, ‘Wagner’ 4), often to the point of 
compromising one’s own happiness (SE 4, TI Pr.). Courage, the virtue most 
similar to the will itself, is present at all three metamorphoses detailed by 
Zarathustra, and it is required by each. In this sense, without courage, 
philosophy is not possible. “Even the most courageous among us rarely has 
the courage for that which he really knows,” Nietzsche claims (TI Maxims 
and Arrows 2). Nor does philosophic courage simply mean courage on the 
page (WP 841). Insight, and with it action, both require courage. 
The final virtue, sympathy, is the one least likely to be associated with 
Nietzsche. Of his virtues, it certainly appears the least often. This is the 
consequence, it would seem, of sympathy already being the most common 
virtue in modern society. Modern morality is nothing if not an exercise in 
sympathy. Nietzsche’s sympathy is not altruism or simply being a good 
neighbor; it is something far more substantial. The eternal return is an act of 
sympathy in that it demands that we will the past, present, and future in 
their entirety, warts and all. The eternal return is not possible under 
conditions of pity, ressentiment, or pessimism, for these are the symptoms 
of the weak and the world-weary. 
For all of Nietzsche’s talk of responsibility, however, it is not right to say that 
the philosophers of the future will be duty-bound to “ordinary human 
beings”; rather, “one has duties only to one’s peers” (BGE 260). Nietzsche’s 
philosophers serve their equals, those of rank who understand the conditions 
necessary for the spiritual advance of a people.[55] For Nietzsche’s new 
philosophers, duty is the culmination of a philosopher’s virtue and the 
greatest source of joy (D 339, SE 5). Sympathy is the highest of Nietzsche’s 
virtues in that it incorporates the others. Nietzsche’s sympathy is a profound 
achievement, where the will to power meets a genuine love of humanity. It 
is an act of “Roman Caesar with Christ’s soul.” 
Nietzsche’s virtues are not his own; they are by no means self-serving. He 
determined them based on what was most needed for modern society, what 
could save and restore a corrupted society. He writes: “A man’s virtues are 
called good depending on their probable consequences not for him but for us 
and society: the praise of virtues has always been far from ‘selfless,’ far 
from ‘unegoistic’....When you have a virtue, a real, whole virtue...you are its 
victim” (GS 21). Christianity and modern morality erred in thinking that 
virtue had anything to do with characteristics other than strength and the 
qualities needed to found and support a healthy culture (TI Skirmishes 37, 
WP 255). Nietzsche’s virtues, those of a self-proclaimed immoralist, are 
those of a philosopher concerned with the future of man. It is these virtues 
that he exhibits in his books and fosters in his readers. 
 
 Conclusion 
 
Will to power is the “essence” of life because it is “the fundamental instinct” 
of nature. In this sense, it can neither be free nor unfree. The choice 
available to man is not whether to will, but what to will. Nietzsche’s depiction 
of solitude makes clear, however, that value-creation is not a wholly internal 
or arbitrary process, and Nietzsche’s philosophers are compelled to justify 
their beliefs according to what they advance in man. The will to power may 
be the heart of Nietzsche’s philosophy, but it is not the whole of it. 
Nietzsche’s new philosophy is that perspective best able to use the natural 
order of rank to guide art, science, religion, and politics for the sake of man 
and culture. 
Although Nietzsche views the eternal return as the highest that is attainable, 
it also reveals the moral and intellectual limits of man. Just as he resists 
universal morality, Nietzsche presents a philosophic imperative to resist 
universal truth.[56] Recognizing the limits of the will and of what we can 
know is the only means of appreciating the new philosophy and founding a 
healthy politics. The eternal return is an acceptance of man’s limitations: it is 
the highest expression of man’s will consistent with nature and the order of 
rank. Nietzsche transcends the nihilism of modernity and deploys the eternal 
return to bring a modicum of morality and order into what he views as an 
otherwise chaotic world. Nietzsche diminishes what man cannot know in 
favor of what man can become. The eternal return was Nietzsche’s definitive 
statement on the value of life: he loved life more than anything else, and 
above all else, more than its meaning.[57] We may well expect that 
Nietzsche’s last thoughts were: “Thus I willed it,” or “Once more..!” Like his 
Zarathustra, Nietzsche danced with Eternity. 
Nietzsche is the first postmodern in that he was the first to comprehend the 
consequences of modernity, what he called Plato’s “higher swindle” (TI 
Ancients 2). Insofar as his successors have failed to grasp his message, 
Nietzsche may be the only postmodern. His meditations may still be 
“untimely.” What has come to be known as postmodernism, Nietzsche would 
contend, is merely the fulfillment of the modern project—another straw on 
the camel’s back. Heidegger and Rorty do not follow Nietzsche’s break, but 
continue modernity in spite of him. Rorty’s decadence, Nietzsche would 
argue, is evident in his preference for the rule of diversity and opinion over a 
respect for nature and the order of rank. Heidegger’s ignorance stems from 
his inability to think through the consequences of his philosophy, and more 
specifically, an inability to differentiate between freedom and fascism. For 
Heidegger, Nazism was just another politics. Nietzsche points away from 
these men. Nietzsche’s works are an attempt to inspire greatness, redirect 
philosophy, and revitalize Western culture. 
Unlike most of his successors, Nietzsche did not destroy the possibility of 
philosophy; rather, he sought to reinvigorate it in what he considered to be 
a superior form. Nietzsche changed both the aims and limits of philosophy, 
making it less concerned with the love of truth and more concerned with a 
love of mankind. A Nietzschean philosopher must not mistake wisdom for life 
or choose a dance with the former over an eternity with the latter. A 
Nietzschean philosopher loves truth, but it is a truth that is life-preserving 
and, ultimately, life-affirming. At once Nietzsche makes philosophy 
dangerous to and responsible for the political. In sum, Nietzsche takes 
philosophy seriously. 
Nietzsche claims that the modern project erred insofar as it sought to 
overcome the problem of nature. What is now called postmodernity has 
erred insofar as it has ignored altogether the problem of nature. Nietzsche 
argues it was appreciating nature as something noble yet unsolvable that 
drove Greek culture to its heights, and makes the Greeks so worthy of 
imitation. For Nietzsche, the distance between physis and nous is to be 
bridged by what he calls philosophy. If nature is the problem for man, then a 
philosophy in the service of life is the best possible answer and the only 
likely solution. 
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